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Issue 2

COURTREPORTS

environmentally, and technically feasible" required a site-specific
determination and use of professional judgment.
The final appeal the court considered and reversed involved the
ALJ's finding that Chapter 373 granted the District authority to issue
water use permits only for "consumptive use of water." The District
rules required a wholesale public supply customer to obtain a separate
permit for quantities beyond amounts used for consumption. The
court's determination hinged on the definition of water for
consumption. The court affirmed the District's authority to require
wholesale public supply customers to obtain a separate permit to effect
conservation requirements.
In its cross-appeal, Pinellas challenged the ALJ's failure to
invalidate the requirement that water supply utilities adopt a "waterconserving rate structure." Pinellas argued the District lacked statutory
authority. The court agreed with the ALJ, finding consideration of a
utility's conservation efforts, including rate structure, appropriate in
determining water allocations and applying the reasonable-beneficial
test. The court held rate autonomy does not imply exemption from
permitting requirements under Chapter 373 and affirmed the ALJ's
validation of the rule.
Note: The court substituted this January 4, 2001 opinion for its earlier
opinion of September 1, 2000. In this later opinion,the court noted
two minor points. First, where the court's September 1 opinion held
the proposed regulation applied to wholesalers did not intrude into
contracts of public supply permittees and wholesale customers, the
substituted opinion declined to rule on this issue. Second, the
substituted opinion affirmed that where any portion of the Florida
Water Act conflicts with any other state law, the Florida Water Act
controls and, thus, here section 373.223(1) would control over section
153.11(1) (b).
ChristineEllison
S.W. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Save the Manatee Club, Inc., 773 So. 2d
594 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (holding Southwest Florida Water
Management District exceeded its authority by promulgating a rule
granting certain exemptions from environmental resource permitting
requirements).
South Shores Partners, Ltd., ("South Shores") applied to the
Southwest Florida Water Management District ("District") for a permit
to develop a 720-acre tract of land. The property had an existing canal
system adjacent to Tampa Bay ("Bay"). As part of the project, South
Shores proposed to build a connecting waterway between the canal
system and the Bay. The Save the Manatee Club feared the proposed
waterway would cause an increase in powerboat traffic into the Bay,
resulting in boat traffic endangering both the manatee and its habitat.
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One of the factors that the District considered when deciding to
issue a permit was the impact a proposed development would have on
wildlife. South Shores argued it was not required to obtain a permit.
South Shores based its argument on a Florida Administrative Code
provision that exempted projects from applying for permits where they
received prior approval.
Save the Manatee Club petitioned the Division of Administrative
Hearings to invalidate the rule. The Administrative LawJudge ("ALJ")
concluded the relevant sections in the rule neither implemented nor
interpreted any specific power granted by the applicable enabling
statute. Thus, the ALJ declared the provision was an invalid exercise of
legislative power. The District appealed.
The court reviewed the enabling statute to determine whether it
granted specific powers or duties to the District that would authorize
the rule. The enabling statute granted the District authority to issue
environmental resource permits according to the statutory criteria
established in the Florida Water Resources Act of 1972. The statute
limited exemptions from the permitting requirements to those that
did not allow significant adverse impacts on the environment. The
court determined the exemption in the regulation was not based on
the absence of a potential impact on the environment, but rather was
based on prior approval. Because the statute did not provide specific
authority for an exemption based on prior approval, the court agreed
with the ALJ and held the rule invalid.
Dawn Watts
Wentworth v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 771 So. 2d 1279 (Fla.Dist. Ct.
App. 2000) (holding notice must be duly published or otherwise
provided to all substantially affected persons before a party can rely on
a Department of Environmental Protection permit grant).
Appellant, George Wentworth, appealed an Amended Final Order
of the Department of Environmental Protection ("DEP") partially
granting his request for permission to build a boat dock over sovereign
submerged lands. Wentworth's property bordered the Indian River
Lagoon, where he wished to build both a dock and access pier through
the lagoon's mangroves. The lagoon was a State Aquatic Preserve, an
Outstanding Florida Water, and subject to special water quality
protection, permitting requirements, and DEP oversight.
Wentworth applied to DEP for a "noticed general permit" and the
agency consent required to build on sovereign submerged lands. The
"noticed general permit" was a pre-approved grant of authority,
until
and unless DEP notified Wentworth otherwise within thirty days. DEP
sent Wentworth notice of agency action and consent to use the
sovereign submerged lands. However, DEP did not send such notice
to Wentworth's neighbors.
In its consent letter, DEP notified
Wentworth that neighbors or other substantially affected parties may
request an administrative hearing contesting the permit within twenty-

